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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper questions if the anomaly in the events of seasoned equity offerings has remained 
significant after it was first documented and analyzed in the year 1995. I find that U.S. domestic 
firms issuing primary and combined SEOs underperform in the three years after issuance between 
1970 and 1994, while the same underperformance is not documented thereafter. This would 
suggest that the current assessment of the SEO anomaly could be biasedly influenced by early 
SEO events conducted before the year 1995. Moreover, this paper provides strong evidence that 
the anomaly is closely related to the incorrect risk adjustment of the Fama-French three-factor 
model.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
inancial anomalies, the empirical regularities that do not align with asset-pricing theories, are 
appealing to both scholars and practitioners for the two reasons. First, the anomalies uncover 
inadequacies of underlying asset-pricing models in explaining real financial data. The second reason 
comes from a normative belief that all tradable assets shall be priced in equilibrium as theorized in the asset-pricing 
models. From this perspective, the anomalies highlight arbitrage profit opportunities. Financial economists have 
devoted many efforts to discover anomalies since the late 1970s, and identified a variety of anomalies. Some of the 
anomalies are discussed by Baker and Wurgler (2002), Banz (1981), Barber and Odean (2000), Basu (1983), 
Campbell (1987), De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Fama and French (1988), French (1980), French et al. (1987), 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), etc. 
 
Schwert (2003) does an excellent job of summarizing the anomalies documented so far. Interestingly, he 
finds that many of the well-known anomalies have been attenuated, reversed, or even negated after they were first 
documented. Regarding this disappearing evidence, he proposes two competing hypotheses. Although the anomalies 
might have been truly present in the past, they have been eliminated by market practitioners who conducted 
arbitrage strategies. Alternatively, the anomalies would be statistical artifacts that were caused by the data-snooping 
bias of Lo and MacKinlay (1990). 
 
In the year 1995, two contemporaneous papers by Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-
Graves (1995) introduced for the first time that equity-issuing firms in the events of seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs) are followed by long-run underperformance over three to five years after issuance. Apparently, this long-run 
underperformance of SEO-issuing firms violates the notion of market efficiency, since the mispricing at issuance is 
not fixed immediately but slowly adjusted over time. According to Daniel et al. (1998), the long-run 
underperformance is caused by overconfidence and biased self-attribution. Overconfident investors too much 
emphasize the precision of their private information on issuing firms’ fundamentals, so they tend to overreact to 
public news of equity issuance. Later on, the self-attribution, which is biased toward the private information, induces 
the investors to underreact to the correct public signal of mispricing over a long time period. In this spirit, the long-
run underperformance is often interchangeable with equity market timing, a managerial opportunistic behavior of 
selling overvalued shares at issuance. 
 
Many papers have been followed on the long-run underperformance of SEO-issuing firms. Excellent 
surveys are available in Ritter (2003), etc. Interestingly, few studies have exclusively focused on the anomaly of 
F 
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equity issuance after it was first identified in the year 1995. As inspired by Schwert (2003), this paper investigates if 
the long-run underperformance has remained robust after the original works by Loughran and Ritter (1995) and 
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995). If the abnormal performance were robust, it could call for further attention on 
discussing how the anomaly is understood in the efficient market hypothesis. Otherwise, the same critique of 
Schwert (2003) could be applied to question if the anomaly is real. 
 
This paper compares the long-term performance of U.S. domestic firms that have conducted SEOs within 
the period of January 1970 to December 1994 (henceforth, pre-publication period) with those within the period of 
January 1995 to December 2007 (henceforth, post-publication period). Several findings emerge. First and foremost, 
SEO-issuers do not underperform during the post-publication period, whereas the long-run underperformance is 
replicated by SEOs that are conducted in the pre-publication period. This finding suggests that the anomaly of equity 
issuance is largely attributable to the abnormal underperformance of early SEO events prior to 1995. The evidence 
of disappearing underperformance after its initial discovery is robust to various subsample analysis and the notion of 
time-varying volatility. Once the momentum factor of Carhart (1997) is included in computing Jensen’s alphas, 
however, the post-issue underperformance is no longer observed in the pre-publication periods. This argues that the 
well-known anomaly could be caused by the incorrect risk adjustment of the Fama-French three-factor model. In 
sum, the findings of this paper highlight the possibility that the famous anomaly of equity issuance is 
overemphasized in current literature. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set of SEOs, and explains 
the methodology used for measuring the performance of SEO-issuing firms in the three years after issuance. Section 
3 examines whether the post-issue underperformance has remained robust after the year 1995, and discusses the 
empirical findings. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 Data 
 
From the Thomson Financial SDC database, I collect all SEOs which were conducted by U.S. domestic 
firms throughout the period of January 1970 to December 2007, and then eliminate the SEOs that are not recorded in 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) CUSIP master file. Following the practices of Lyandres et al. 
(2008), I further exclude (a) ADRs, ADSs, and GDRs, (b) SEOs without SDC information on offering prices, (c) 
SEOs in which offering prices are less than $5, (d) simultaneous offerings of debt and equity, (e) simultaneous 
offerings to domestic and foreign markets, (f) unit offerings, (g) offerings not listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ, 
(h) offerings having no returns on the CRSP monthly return files during the 73-month period centered on the issue 
month, and (i) offerings not having a CRSP share code of either 10 or 11. 
 
In the events of primary SEOs, firms sell new equity shares for raising external capital to exercise growth 
options. It is in the events of secondary SEOs that old shareholders sell their own existing shares to liquidate their 
positions that are locked by initial investments at start-up. Throughout this paper, I define primary SEOs as SEOs 
that consist of 100% new equity shares and secondary SEOs as SEOs that consist of 100% existing equity shares, 
respectively. If a SEO is neither primary nor secondary, it is defined as a combined SEO in which mixed shares of 
both new and existing equity shares are offered. This classification results in 5,664 primary SEOs, 2,766 combined 
SEOs, and 1,768 secondary SEOs. 
 
2.2 Methodology 
 
As recommended by Mitchell and Stafford (2000), the performance of SEO issuers in the three years after 
issuance is measured by Jensen's alphas of the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and the four-factor 
model of Carhart (1997). In specific, dependent variables in the factor regressions are monthly returns on a calendar-
time equal-weighting (EW) portfolio of firms that have issued SEOs in the past three years. The EW portfolio is 
rebalanced each month by replacing old firms whose monthly returns reach the end of three-year period with new 
firms which conduct SEOs in that month. Monthly returns on SEO-issuing firms are obtained from the CRSP. 
Kenneth French’s website provides monthly returns on the Fama-French factors and the momentum factor. 
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The calendar-time portfolio approach is advocated by many long-term event-time studies to reduce 
spurious statistical inferences. For instance, Fama (1998) points out that a bad-model problem is not avoidable in 
any tests for market efficiency, and claims that the calendar-time portfolio method can reduce the problem by some 
degree. Barber and Lyon (1997) emphasize that buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) are inevitably subject to 
the cross-correlations of long-run event windows. Due to the overlapping event windows, they argue that the 
BHARs could incorrectly overestimate test statistics, so the null of no equity market timing is too frequently 
rejected. Finally, Schultz (2003) advises the calendar-time portfolio approach to avoid the pseudo market timing that 
the long-run underperformance, which is established by the BHAR approach, has nothing to do with the true market 
timing ability. 
 
When constructing the portfolio of issuers as a dependent variable in the factor regression, I use an EW 
scheme rather than a value-weighting (VW) scheme. According to Loughran and Ritter (2000), the VW scheme 
gives more weights to large-value firms, although the mispricing at issuance is likely to be more common to small-
growth stocks, and thus substantially underestimates the underperformance of small-growth issuers. At the same 
time, the EW scheme could amplify the bad-model problem of Fama (1998) in that the Fama-French three-factor 
model tends to overestimate the expected returns on small-growth firms. This means that the equity market timing 
could be erroneously exaggerated under the EW scheme in which more weights are given to small-growth firms. 
Altogether, both studies predict that the equity market timing, if it is present, shall be more magnified under the EW 
scheme, an empirical observation documented in many previous studies. For this reason the EW scheme leads to 
more powerful tests for long-run underperformance.
1
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Jensen’s alpha of the Fama-French three-factor model, denoted by
FF
 , is estimated by: 
 
1 2 3
,
pt ft t t t tFF
r r MKT SMB HML           
 
where 
pt
r  is the monthly return on a calendar-time EW portfolio of issuers, 
ft
r  is the one-month T-bill rate, 
t
MKT  is 
the monthly excess return on a market portfolio, 
t
SMB  is the monthly return on a zero-investment portfolio buying 
small stocks and selling big stocks, and 
t
HML  is the monthly return on a zero-investment portfolio buying growth 
stocks and selling value stocks. In a similar spirit, Jensen’s alphas of the four-factor model of Carhart (1997), 
denoted by 
MOM
 , is estimated by: 
 
1 2 3 4
,
pt ft t t t t tMOM
r r MKT SMB HML WML             
 
where 
t
WML  is the monthly return on a zero-investment portfolio buying winning stocks and selling losing stocks. 
Throughout this paper, robust t-statistics are calculated to correct for potential heteroskedasticity. 
 
Table 1: Post-Issue Performance of SEO-Issuing Firms 
Period Primary SEOs Combined SEOs Secondary SEOs 
1970-2007 -0.0029 (-2.575) -0.0030 (-2.514) -0.0000 (-0.029) 
1970-1994 -0.0031 (-2.680) -0.0032 (-2.736) 0.0013 (1.293) 
1995-2007 -0.0030 (-1.614) -0.0026 (-1.167) -0.0005 (-0.278) 
1995-1998, 2001-2007 -0.0020 (-1.019) -0.0017 (-0.660) -0.0009 (-0.498) 
1995-2004 -0.0047 (-2.735) -0.0038 (-1.351) -0.0042 (-2.154) 
1995-1998, 2001-2004 -0.0036 (-1.885) -0.0020 (-0.605) -0.0048 (-2.565) 
Note: T-statistics in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
 
                                                 
1 Using SEOs placed during the period from 1970 to 2005, Lyandres et al. (2008) find that the VW alpha from the Fama-French factor model is 
approximately the same magnitude as the EW alpha. I find that all results of this paper unchanged under the VW scheme. The results are 
available upon request. 
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Table 1 examines the post-issue performance in the three years after issuance in terms of Jensen’s alphas 
from the Fama-French three-factor model. Over the period between 1970 and 2007, 
FF
  in primary and combined 
SEOs are significantly negative at the 5% significance level. This long-run underperformance is often interpreted as 
the managerial market-timing abilities of selling new and mixed equity shares at their overvalued prices (Rangan, 
1998; Teoh et al., 2002; etc.). For secondary SEOs, 
FF
  turns out to be insignificant over the same period. As shown 
by Lee (1997) and Heron and Lie (2004), this finding is consistent with the fact that secondary SEOs are conducted 
to liquidate the positions of old shareholders rather than to exploit mispricing. 
 
Next, I divide the entire sample period into two sub periods, a pre-publication period between 1970 and 
1994 and a post-publication period between 1995 and 2007. The long-run performance in the era of pre-publication 
is not different from that over the entire sample period; i.e., 
FF
  are significantly negative in the primary and 
combined offerings, while 
FF
  is insignificant in the secondary offerings. Over the period 1995 to 2007 Jensen’s 
alphas of the Fama-French model are not significantly different from zero in three types of offerings. The abnormal 
underperformance of primary and combined SEO-issuing firms completely disappeared after it was first documented 
in the year 1995, just like many anomalies discussed in Schwert (2003). This implies that our current assessments of 
the market timing abilities in the primary and combined SEO events can be largely influenced by the abnormal 
performance which is confined to the pre-publication period alone. 
 
Table 1 further investigates the post-issue performance of SEO-issuing firms in various post-publication 
periods. First, I consider the case in which the issuer portfolios consist of firms that have issued SEOs over the 
period 1995 to 2004, excluding 1999 and 2000. In other words, SEOs placed during a dot-com bubble period are 
dropped to control for the potential influence of excessive optimism on post-issue performance. Next, I construct the 
issuer portfolios by using firms that have issued SEOs over the period 1995 to 2004. This subsample analysis 
intends to control for the stock market crash starting in 2008, and so examines the post-issue performance until 
December of 2007. Finally, the subsample analysis controls both the dot-com bubble of 1999-2000 and the market 
crash starting in 2008. 
 
In the first subsample, the Fama-French alphas are insignificant at the 5% level in the events of primary and 
combined SEOs. This finding suggests that the disappearing underperformance in the era of post-publication is not 
caused by the over-optimism flourished during a dot-com bubble period. Remarkably, the second subsample 
analysis shows that primary SEOs underperforms over the period between 1995 and 2004. However, the 
underperformance is not observed for combined SEOs over the same subsample period. Indeed, the third subsample 
analysis does not find the post-issue underperformance of primary and combined SEOs when controlling for both 
effects of dot-com bubble and market crash. So, the mixed evidence of underperformance makes it difficult to 
conclude that the abnormal market conditions starting in 2008 could lead to the attenuating anomaly of equity 
issuance in the post-publication period. 
 
One may be surprised by the secondary SEO observations in the second an third subsample periods, since 
secondary SEOs are followed by long-run underperformance in terms of the Fama-French alphas. To my best 
knowledge, no previous literature demonstrates the same anomaly, so that one might take it as the new anomaly of 
equity issuance. However, the subsequent analysis of this paper shall show that Jensen’s alphas in the same periods 
are no longer significantly different from zero if the momentum factor of Carhart (1997) is included in the factor 
regression. In my opinion, thus, the negative alphas in the secondary SEO events could be the outcome of the 
incorrect risk adjustment of the Fama-French model. 
 
As shown in Table 1, Jensen’s alpha from the Fama-French factor model is significantly negative in the 
pre-publication period but insignificantly negative in the post-publication period. Particularly for primary SEOs, 
FF
  in the pre-publication period is almost identical in magnitude to that in the post-publication period; i.e., -0.0031 
versus -0.0030. This means that no rejection of the null hypothesis that 
FF
  is equal to zero in the post-publication 
period must be caused by a higher value of standard error of the EW portfolio of issuers during the period between 
1995 and 2007. Notice that the post-publication period is featured with several exotic events of the dot-com bubble 
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of 1999-2000, the 9/11 terrorist attack of 2001, and the subprime mortgage crisis starting in 2008. All of the events 
could result in the distinct patterns of return volatility between the pre- and post-publication periods by raising the 
uncertainty of return-generating processes of individual SEO-issuing firms during the post-publication period. 
Therefore, Table 1 might erroneously estimate Jensen’s alphas since the volatility is implicitly assumed to be 
constant over time. 
 
With the notion of time-varying volatility, I estimate again 
FF
  with the generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model of Bollerslev (1986). Following French et al. (1987), I use the full 
sample data of monthly return on the EW portfolio of issuers for implementing the GARCH (1, 1) model.
2
 Formally 
speaking, two equations for mean and variance are given by: 
 
1 2 3
2 2 2
0 1 1 1 1
pt ft t t t t
t t t
FF
r r MKT SMB HML
a a b
    
  
 
     
  
 
 
where 
2
1
[ ]
t t t
Var 

 . Model parameters are estimated using conditional maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). 
 
Table 2: Post-Issue Performance of SEO-Issuing Firms with Conditional Variance 
Period Primary SEOs Combined SEOs Secondary SEOs 
1970-2007 -0.0031 (-4.226) -0.0030 (-3.604) 0.0009 (1.303) 
1970-1994 -0.0036 (-4.225) -0.0037 (-3.868) 0.0013 (1.569) 
1995-2007 -0.0019 (-1.269) -0.0020 (-1.420) 0.0003 (0.396) 
Note: Model parameters are estimated using conditional MLE. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Table 2 finds that the findings of Table 1 are preserved along with the assumption of time-varying 
conditional volatility. In terms of Jensen’s alpha from the Fama-French model, both primary and combined SEO-
issuers underperform in the pre-publication period, while the same underperformance after issuance is not 
documented in the post-publication period. I find no anomaly in the event of secondary SEOs. After controlling for 
the time-varying volatility, thus, the findings still conclude that the long-run underperformance of primary and 
combined SEOs is confined to early offerings in the pre-publication period. 
 
A leading behavioral model of Daniel et al. (1998) assumes that investors are subject to two psychological 
biases of overconfidence and biased self-attribution. According to their model, the overconfidence of investors 
provides an issuer with a window-of-opportunity to sell new and mixed equity shares at their overvalued prices. One 
thinks of the price run-up prior to issuance, which is triggered by investors’ overconfidence, as a necessary 
ingredient resulting in the post-issue underperformance of primary and combined SEOs. In the framework of Daniel 
et al. (1998), in turn, the disappearing anomaly of equity issuance is anticipated if the price run-ups prior to issuance 
are absent in the post-publication period. 
 
Table 3: Pre-Issue Performance of SEO-Issuing Firms 
Period Primary SEOs Combined SEOs Secondary SEOs 
1970-2007 0.0129 (12.236) 0.0311 (24.507) 0.0148 (14.460) 
1970-1994 0.0097 (8.205) 0.0285 (20.287) 0.0145 (13.475) 
1995-2007 0.0183 (10.597) 0.0361 (14.403) 0.0174 (9.088) 
Note: T-statistics in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
 
Table 3 examines the pre-issue performance of SEO-issuing firms in the three years before issuance. I 
estimate Jensen’s alpha from the Fama-French model by using monthly returns on a calendar-time EW portfolio of 
firms that will issue SEOs in the subsequent 36 months over each sample period. I find that Jensen’s alphas are 
significantly positive at the 5% level for all types of offerings over all sub-periods. In specific, the theoretical model 
of Daniel et al. (1998) seems to work for the primary and combined SEO events in the pre-publication period; i.e., 
the price increases prior to issuance are followed by long-run underperformance. Coupled with no underperformance 
                                                 
2 I choose to model the GARCH (p, q) for p = 1, 2 and q = 1, 2. Under the different choices of p and q, the results remain unchanged. The results 
are available upon request. 
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in the post-publication period, however, the documented price run-ups in the primary and combined SEOs conclude 
that the behavioral explanation of Daniel et al. (1998) is hardly applied to the disappearing long-run performance 
during the post-publication period. 
 
The bad-model problem of Fama (1998) explains that the long-run underperformance could be caused by 
the inadequacy of the Fama-French model in computing Jensen’s alphas. Thus, it is worthwhile to evaluate the post-
issue performance using alternative asset-pricing models. Among others, I choose the four-factor model of Carhart 
(1997) in which a momentum factor is augmented as the fourth risk factor. The momentum factor reflects a portion 
of risk metrics, which is not explained by the Fama-French three-factor model. 
 
Table 4: Long-Run Performance of SEO-Issuing Firms, Evaluated by the Four-Factor Model 
Period Primary SEOs Combined SEOs Secondary SEOs 
1970-2007 -0.0011 (-0.967) -0.0004 (-0.347) 0.0018 (1.727) 
1970-1994 -0.0019 (-1.496) -0.0019 (-1.585) 0.0018 (1.756) 
1995-2007 -0.0012 (-0.680) 0.0003 (0.182) 0.0018 (0.976) 
1995-1998, 2001-2007 -0.0006 (-0.289) 0.0009 (0.342) 0.0012 (0.677) 
1995-2004 -0.0020 (-1.319) 0.0014 (0.581) -0.0013 (-0.666) 
1995-1998, 2001-2004 -0.0016 (-0.837) 0.0024 (0.616) -0.0021 (-1.194) 
Note: T-statistics in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
 
Table 4 examines the long-run performance of SEO-issuing firms using the four-factor model. The results 
are interesting. I find that no intercepts remain significant in the events of primary, combined, and secondary SEOs 
over any periods. That is to say, once the four-factor model is admitted as a correct asset-pricing model, the anomaly 
of equity issuance completely disappears. This evidence is questioning if the well-known anomaly of equity 
issuance may be more artificial than actual, which is caused by the incorrect risk adjustment of the Fama-French 
three-factor model. In particular, the subsample analysis for secondary SEOs concludes that the anomaly of 
secondary SEOs in Table 1 does not remain robust when the four-factor model is adopted, thereby strengthening that 
the post-issue abnormal performance is observed only under the Fama-French factor model. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
A research by Schwert (2003) documents that many of the well-known anomalies have been attenuated or 
have disappeared since they were first identified and analyzed, which subsequently leads to the important critique 
that the anomalies are simply overemphasized in many studies. Inspired by his work, this paper questions if the 
long-run underperformance of firms that have conducted SEOs remain robust after the anomaly was first 
documented in Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995). If the abnormal performance of 
equity issuance does not remain robust, the same critique of Schwert (2003) can be applied. 
 
A calendar-time portfolio approach is used to evaluate the performance of SEO-issuing firms in the three 
years after issuance. Several findings emerge. In terms of Jensen’s alphas from the Fama-French model, the post-
issue underperformance is supported by primary and combined SEOs that are placed by U.S. domestic firms during 
the entire sample period ranging from 1970 to 2007. However, the long-run underperformance is confined to SEOs 
in the pre-publication period between 1970 and 1994, and disappears in the post-publication period starting in the 
year 1995. The evidence of disappearing underperformance is robust to different subsample analysis and the notion 
of time-varying conditional volatility. Therefore, the anomaly of equity issuance, which is often cited in the current 
literature as the managerial market-timing ability to sell overvalued equity at issuance, is largely attributable to the 
abnormal behavior of early SEO events prior to the year 1995. Moreover, the behavioral theory does not explain the 
disappearing anomaly of equity issuance during the post-publication period. Once the momentum factor of Carhart 
(1997) is included as the fourth systematic risk factor, the post-issue underperformance is no longer observed for 
primary and combined SEOs for any cases. This suggests that the well-known anomaly of equity issuance could be 
related to the incorrect risk adjustment of the Fama-French three factor model, an asset-pricing model used in the 
original studies of Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995). Overall, this paper concludes 
that the post-issue underperformance of primary and combined SEO-conducting firms may be exaggerated to some 
degree. 
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